Investment related to state shareholder of listed companies shall accord with the related provisions on state asset management (五)涉及上市公司國(guó)有股股東的,應(yīng)符合國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理的相關(guān)規(guī)定。
Moreover , the thesis discusses how to protect the substantive rights of state shareholders by making use of the state - owned assets supervision and administration of commission in view of the special situation of state shareholder ' s right of china 最后,基于我國(guó)國(guó)有股股東權(quán)的特殊情況,論文還對(duì)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)在利用股東訴訟保護(hù)國(guó)有股東的實(shí)體權(quán)利方面應(yīng)起的作用進(jìn)行了討論。
The state shareholders and managers of the listed company tuned the assets by the lots of unlawful related transactions and break into the benefits of the minority in the practice in china , just reflecting this phenomenon . the lack of effective inner and outsider control mechanism in the holding companies has been one of the most difficult problems in the reform to the state owned enterprises and will be the key to the normal governance corporation in holding companies . although the research to the holding company and the assignment of the control rights has been done a lot , the integration of two conceptions was not paid attention to 本文在參考國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者大量文獻(xiàn)后,將歷史分析與邏輯分析、規(guī)范分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合,對(duì)于公司控制權(quán)重新加以界定;考慮國(guó)有控股公司的特殊性質(zhì),對(duì)于目前國(guó)有控股公司內(nèi)部和外部的控制權(quán)配置機(jī)制加以客觀分析,指出其中存在的制度缺陷和現(xiàn)實(shí)障礙;并且按照國(guó)有控股公司控制權(quán)優(yōu)化配置原則,對(duì)于公司內(nèi)部各利益主體之間和內(nèi)部存在的博弈關(guān)系加以解析,以國(guó)有控股上市公司為例,解釋外部市場(chǎng)環(huán)境對(duì)于公司控制權(quán)配置的實(shí)證影響;進(jìn)一步闡述了優(yōu)化國(guó)有控股公司控制權(quán)配置的制度安排和路徑選擇。
Chinese corporations are characterized by high proportion of shares owned by states and corporations and the adoption of dltp can suit the status in quo and protects state shareholders " interests . but because of the influence of sequela of planned economy , wrongful application of organ principle and legal tradition of our nation , dltp is not accepted by our legislation . the author 由于計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)的后遺癥、對(duì)公司機(jī)關(guān)理論的不恰當(dāng)運(yùn)用‘以及我國(guó)重刑輕民的法律傳統(tǒng),除證券法以外,我國(guó)立法并無(wú)董事對(duì)第三人責(zé)任的規(guī)定,筆者認(rèn)為,應(yīng)修改相關(guān)立法,引入董事對(duì)第三人責(zé)任制度。